Mumbai (By Suresh Chotai): More than two decades after the Kimberley Process (KP) was born, the diamond industry still faces an uncomfortable truth: the global system designed to keep “Conflict diamonds” out of the market is stuck in the past.

The Kimberley Process defines conflict diamonds narrowly—stones used by rebel movements to finance wars against legitimate governments. That definition made sense in the early 2000s, when conflicts in Sierra Leone and Angola shocked the world. But today, violence linked to diamonds looks very different.

So why hasn’t the definition changed? The answer lies not in ignorance, but in politics.

The key constraints are outlined below:

1. Consensus-Based Decision Making

• The KP operates strictly on consensus among all participants (over 80 governments plus industry and civil society).
• Even one or two dissenting countries can block a change.
• This gives significant veto power to nations that fear political, economic, or reputational consequences.

2. Narrow Original Mandate

• The current definition limits conflict diamonds to those used by rebel movements to finance wars against legitimate governments.
• Many participants argue that expanding the definition would fundamentally alter the KP’s founding mandate, which was designed as a trade control mechanism—not a broad human rights instrument.
• Some governments fear “mission creep.”

3. Political Sensitivities of Sovereign States

• An expanded definition that includes state-sponsored violence, human rights abuses, or private armed groups would expose governments themselves to scrutiny.
• Several diamond-producing countries are wary of a framework that could be used to sanction state actions, seeing this as an infringement on sovereignty.

4. Fear of Trade Disruption

• Many producing and trading countries worry that a broader definition could:
  • Trigger frequent suspensions
  • Disrupt legitimate diamond exports
  • Harm livelihoods in mining communities
• This concern is especially strong in developing economies dependent on diamond revenues.

5. Divergent Economic Interests

• Major diamond-producing, cutting, and trading centres do not always align:
  • Producers fear sanctions
  • Traders fear supply instability
  • Cutting centres fear loss of competitiveness
• These conflicting interests make agreement on stricter standards difficult.

6. Industry Resistance to Regulatory Uncertainty

• Parts of the diamond industry worry that an expanded definition would:
  • Increase compliance costs
  • Create legal ambiguity
  • Introduce reputational risks without clear enforcement standards
• Industry bodies often prefer voluntary due diligence frameworks over binding KP rule changes.

7. Civil Society–Government Divide

• Civil society organisations advocate for inclusion of:
  • Human rights abuses
  • Violence by state or private security forces
• Some governments view these demands as too broad or politically motivated, leading to mistrust and disengagement (including periodic civil society walkouts from KP forums).

8. Lack of Clear Enforcement Mechanisms

• Expanding the definition would require:
  • New monitoring tools
  • Independent verification
  • Clear thresholds for violations
• Many participants argue the KP lacks the institutional capacity and resources to enforce a broader definition effectively.

9. Geopolitical Alignments

• Voting blocs and regional alliances often influence KP outcomes.
• Countries facing similar governance or security challenges tend to oppose precedent-setting changes that could later be applied to them.

10. Reliance on Parallel Frameworks

• Some KP members argue that issues like human rights and environmental harm are already addressed through:
  • OECD Due Diligence Guidance
  • UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
• This view is used to justify keeping the KP definition narrow.

In Summary

The failure to change the definition of blood diamonds is not due to lack of awareness, but rather:

• Structural rigidity of the KP
• Political reluctance to accept scrutiny
• Economic risk aversion
• Absence of consensus on enforcement

For reform to succeed, leadership (such as during India’s chairmanship this year) would need to focus on incremental changes, confidence-building measures, and clearer separation between trade facilitation and human rights accountability.